An adopted child is entitled to information from its biological mother about the identity of the biological father

19 January 2022

The XII. The civil senate of the Federal Court of Justice has ruled that a biological mother is fundamentally obliged to provide her child with information about the identity of the biological father even after adoption.

The underlying case concerned an applicant born in 1984 who requested information about the person of the biological father from her biological mother, the respondent. At the time of her birth, the respondent, who had grown up in problematic family circumstances, had just turned 16. She only noticed the pregnancy in the seventh month and left the secondary school, where she was in the seventh grade at the time, without a diploma. After the birth, she first lived with the applicant in a mother-child home and later in a shared flat for girls before the applicant was adopted by a married couple. A paternity determination procedure carried out in 1985 was just as unsuccessful as an extrajudicial paternity test with another man. At the end of 2003, mediated by the youth welfare office, the applicant and opponent met. After the applicant had unsuccessfully asked the respondent in March 2018 to name and address the biological father, she has now requested this information in the court proceedings. The district court rejected the application because the respondent was unable to provide information. In response to the applicant's appeal, the Higher Regional Court amended this decision and, in accordance with the application, obliged the respondent to give the applicant the full name and address of all the men who were with the respondent during the legal period of conception.

The Federal Court of Justice rejected the appeal on points of law lodged by the respondent.

The basis for the claim for the requested information is the provision of § 1618 a BGB, according to which parents and children owe each other assistance and consideration. Even if the regulation does not provide for any specific sanctions in the event of a violation, parents and children can mutually develop legal claims from it. The general right of personality entails the constitutional obligation of the state to take appropriate account of the individual's need for protection before the withholding of available information about one's own origins when structuring the legal relationships between the persons concerned. This must be taken into account when interpreting § 1618 a BGB*, especially since the legislature has not expressly standardized a right to information. Unlike the claim of the so-called dummy father against the child's mother for information about the identity of the biological father of the child, for which the Federal Constitutional Court rejected a derivation from the principles of good faith (§ 242 BGB**) and demanded an express legal basis , it is not just a matter of asserting financial interests. Rather, the right to information strengthens a legal position of very considerable constitutional importance, namely the right to know one's own descent.

The fact that the respondent is no longer the legal mother of the applicant due to the adoption of the applicant and the expiration of the legal parent-child relationship resulting from Section 1755 (1) sentence 1 BGB due to adoption does not conflict with the claim. Because the obligation to provide information between the child and the mother arose before the adoption. If one were to see this differently, adoption would, with regard to the right to know one's parentage, lead to an unjustified disadvantage compared to children whose legal parent-child relationship with their biological mother continues. In the present case, the Respondent has not presented any significant considerations that speak against her obligation to provide information, but on the contrary at no time denied that the claimant's right to information exists in principle. Thus, she did not invoke specific concerns that could lead to denying the existence of the right to information with regard to her right to respect for her private and intimate sphere, which is also protected under constitutional law.

With the mere statement that she could not remember any possible producer, the respondent has not fulfilled her right to information. Nor has she stated that it is impossible for her to fulfill her obligations even after making reasonable inquiries. The Higher Regional Court has listed a number of possible contact persons that the respondent can turn to in order to obtain information about the applicant's potential biological fathers. There is no lack of chance of success with these inquiries, nor are they unreasonable for the respondent.