12 juilliet 1994

La traite des enfants en Roumanie est florissante comme jamais auparavant

ROTTERDAM - Des centaines d'enfants disparaissent de Roumanie chaque semaine. Les travailleurs humanitaires estiment que leur nombre est encore plus élevé qu'en 1991, lorsqu'au moins quinze mille bébés, tout-petits et enfants d'âge préscolaire roumains ont été vendus à l'étranger en un an. Dans aucun autre pays d'Europe centrale et orientale, il n'y en a autant. les enfants comme marchandise.

Il y a plus de deux ans, sous la pression des organisations internationales, la Roumanie a promis de durcir les lois sur l'adoption. Mais en pratique rien n'en sort ; l'application de la loi est constamment retardée et des avocats rusés continuent à éluder les nouvelles dispositions. Selon des initiés, le rôle joué par le ministère roumain de la Santé dans cet horrible commerce est "très douteux".

La police roumaine a récemment admis ouvertement pour la première fois que les nombreuses activités des organisations criminelles roumaines et étrangères

Caroline Swartz

The aftermath of the 1989 Romanian Revolution has been compared to the "Wild West" period of United States frontier expansion between 1850 and 1890. Immediately following the Revolution the influx of foreigners and foreign aid proved impossible to coordinate or control. As the London Sunday Times put it, "New charities sprung up like dandelions in wet grass" (Carol Sarler, "Shame About The Babies," 20 January 1991, 18-30). Well-meaning people with little or no experience in Central and Eastern Europe came to Romania prepared to do anything they could to help. The free-for-all in aid distribution caused confusion and an overlap of efforts. Consequently, orphanages in the northern and western parts of Romania received more aid than they could handle, while many orphanages in other parts of the country received very little.

The popular view that "some help is better than no help at all," spurred an inestimable number of Westerners to travel to Romania with loaded cars and trucks. Material goods flooded through the doors of orphanages with the natural assumption that the children would be relieved of some of their suffering. As more and more foreigners were exposed to the orphanages, stories spread of the vast numbers of institutions and widespread abuse of children. The conditions were appalling, and the response was to provide better equipment, more supplies, and volunteers to lighten the workload of the small number of staff in each facility. Some groups addressing these needs believed that the best solution was for the children to be adopted by foreign families. They assumed that Romanians could not manage adoptions because of their poverty and political instability.

The "AIDS epidemic" further raised the plight of Romania's orphans to the world. Doctors fanned across the country, bringing with them disposable syringes and other AIDS-prevention techniques. People sought to bring any comfort possible to these suffering children as they attempted to understand how such an atrocity could have been overlooked or ignored under Ceausescu's regime.

Now, more than three years later, many still assume that this type of crisis relief and care is what is needed. Yet experience has shown that the roots of the problems lie much deeper than emergency relief can penetrate. Immediate needs are, in most cases, being met with medical supplies, building equipment, and personnel. However, the increasing concern now is that emergency aid progress to a strategy of development.

Caroline Swartz

The aftermath of the 1989 Romanian Revolution has been compared to the "Wild West" period of United States frontier expansion between 1850 and 1890. Immediately following the Revolution the influx of foreigners and foreign aid proved impossible to coordinate or control. As the London Sunday Times put it, "New charities sprung up like dandelions in wet grass" (Carol Sarler, "Shame About The Babies," 20 January 1991, 18-30). Well-meaning people with little or no experience in Central and Eastern Europe came to Romania prepared to do anything they could to help. The free-for-all in aid distribution caused confusion and an overlap of efforts. Consequently, orphanages in the northern and western parts of Romania received more aid than they could handle, while many orphanages in other parts of the country received very little.

The popular view that "some help is better than no help at all," spurred an inestimable number of Westerners to travel to Romania with loaded cars and trucks. Material goods flooded through the doors of orphanages with the natural assumption that the children would be relieved of some of their suffering. As more and more foreigners were exposed to the orphanages, stories spread of the vast numbers of institutions and widespread abuse of children. The conditions were appalling, and the response was to provide better equipment, more supplies, and volunteers to lighten the workload of the small number of staff in each facility. Some groups addressing these needs believed that the best solution was for the children to be adopted by foreign families. They assumed that Romanians could not manage adoptions because of their poverty and political instability.

The "AIDS epidemic" further raised the plight of Romania's orphans to the world. Doctors fanned across the country, bringing with them disposable syringes and other AIDS-prevention techniques. People sought to bring any comfort possible to these suffering children as they attempted to understand how such an atrocity could have been overlooked or ignored under Ceausescu's regime.

Now, more than three years later, many still assume that this type of crisis relief and care is what is needed. Yet experience has shown that the roots of the problems lie much deeper than emergency relief can penetrate. Immediate needs are, in most cases, being met with medical supplies, building equipment, and personnel. However, the increasing concern now is that emergency aid progress to a strategy of development.

Big lot or uprooting? Since child trafficking made headlines, adoptions of children from abroad have become talkative

:

Fabiana F., daughter from the foreign world

By Barbara Sichtermann

June 24, 1994, 9:00 am

Press release 31 May 1994

EU TO FOLLOW ORPHANAGE AID WITH INITIATIVE TO BUILD NATIONAL POLICY FOR ROMANIAN CHILDREN

Top

IP/94/458

After nearly 4 years of emergency and medium-term aid to alleviate

Tschechien

Heimatlose Würmer

Recently, the Supreme Court recognized the right of children at home to know who their parents are. Why the longing for the real parents? 'It's the trivial questions you want answers to. Who gave me those sweaty feet?'

Daphne van Rossum

May 18, 1994 – published in no. 20

THE FIRST TIME I saw my father I was twenty. Tall and gray, he was waiting at a table at the Americain Hotel. We were strangers to each other. I was barely three when he left. How was I supposed to greet him? In the film, people would have flown around each other's necks. I shook his hand. The meeting was inevitable.

For years I tormented myself and those around me with questions about this man. According to my mother, he didn't even deserve the designation father. She invariably called him 'your begetter'. My aunts told terrible stories about him, they knew no one more impossible than him. So over the years I have developed a strong desire to meet him. There must be something wrong with him, right? After all, I was also a sweet child, and who gave me that cap nose?

Maria de R. mag weten wie haar vader is

NIET BEKEND, op 16 april '94, 00:00, bijgewerkt 15 januari '09, 20:18

Maria de R. mag eindelijk vernemen wie haar vader was. De Hoge Raad heeft vrijdag beslist dat zij recht heeft op inzage van de dossiers waarin zich de gegevens over haar afstamming bevinden. Het arrest is de afronding van een vierjarige juridische strijd van de 58-jarige vrouw uit Breda.

Van onze verslaggever

DEN HAAG

NRC Handelsblad

06-04-1994

4

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Brussels to renew our Alliance in light of the historic transformations affecting the entire continent of Europe. We welcome the new climate of cooperation that has emerged in Europe with the end of the period of global confrontation embodied in the Cold War. However, we must also note that other causes of instability, tension and conflict have emerged. We therefore confirm the enduring validity and indispensability of our Alliance. It is based on a strong transatlantic link, the expression of a shared destiny. It reflects a European Security and Defence Identity gradually emerging as the expression of a mature Europe. It is reaching out to establish new patterns of cooperation throughout Europe. It rests, as also reflected in Article 2 of the Washington Treaty, upon close collaboration in all fields.
   • to adapt further the Alliance's political and military structures to reflect both the full spectrum of its roles and the development of the emerging European Security and Defence Identity, and endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces;
   • to reaffirm that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European countries;
   • to launch a major initiative through a Partnership for Peace, in which we invite Partners to join us in new political and military efforts to work alongside the Alliance;
   • to intensify our efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
2. We reaffirm our strong commitment to the transatlantic link, which is the bedrock of NATO. The continued substantial presence of United States forces in Europe is a fundamentally important aspect of that link. All our countries wish to continue the direct involvement of the United States and Canada in the security of Europe. We note that this is also the expressed wish of the new democracies of the East, which see in the transatlantic link an irreplaceable pledge of security and stability for Europe as a whole. The fuller integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union into a Europe whole and free cannot be successful without the strong and active participation of all Allies on both sides of the Atlantic.
3. Today, we confirm and renew this link between North America and a Europe developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy and taking on greater responsibility on defence matters. We welcome the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht and the launching of the European Union, which will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and allow it to make a more coherent contribution to the security of all the Allies. We reaffirm that the Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.
4. We give our full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity which, as called for in the Maastricht Treaty, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union, might in time lead to a common defence compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. The emergence of a European Security and Defence Identity will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link and will enable European Allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defence. The Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests.
5. We support strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union, which is being developed as the defence component of the European Union. The Alliance's organisation and resources will be adjusted so as to facilitate this. We welcome the close and growing cooperation between NATO and the WEU that has been achieved on the basis of agreed principles of complementarity and transparency. In future contingencies, NATO and the WEU will consult, including as necessary through joint Council meetings, on how to address such contingencies.
6. We therefore stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. We support the development of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security. Better European coordination and planning will also strengthen the European pillar and the Alliance itself. Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Security and Defence Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies' ability to work together in the common defence and other tasks.
7. In pursuit of our common transatlantic security requirements, NATO increasingly will be called upon to undertake missions in addition to the traditional and fundamental task of collective defence of its members, which remains a core function. We reaffirm our offer to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. Participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions.
8. Against this background, NATO must continue the adaptation of its command and force structure in line with requirements for flexible and timely responses contained in the Alliance's Strategic Concept. We also will need to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance by facilitating the use of our military capabilities for NATO and European/WEU operations, and assist participation of non-NATO partners in joint peacekeeping operations and other contingencies as envisaged under the Partnership for Peace.
9. Therefore, we direct the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, to examine how the Alliance's political and military structures and procedures might be developed and adapted to conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance's missions, including peacekeeping, as well as to improve cooperation with the WEU and to reflect the emerging European Security and Defence Identity. As part of this process, we endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance. We have directed the North Atlantic Council, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, to develop this concept and establish the necessary capabilities. The Council, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, and in coordination with the WEU, will work on implementation in a manner that provides separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU. The North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session will report on the implementation of these decisions to Ministers at their next regular meeting in June 1994.
10. Our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of direct and material concern to us, as they are to all other CSCE states under the commitments of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. We remain deeply committed to further strengthening the CSCE, which is the only organisation comprising all European and North American countries, as an instrument of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, cooperative security, and the advancement of democracy and human rights. We actively support the efforts to enhance the operational capabilities of the CSCE for early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management.
11. As part of our overall effort to promote preventive diplomacy, we welcome the European Union proposal for a Pact on Stability in Europe, will contribute to its elaboration, and look forward to the opening conference which will take place in Paris in the Spring.
12. Building on the close and long-standing partnership among the North American and European Allies, we are committed to enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.
13. We have decided to launch an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership for Peace. We invite the other states participating in the NACC, and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme, to join with us in this Partnership. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.
14. The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace. Partner states will be invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities. The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.
15. To promote closer military cooperation and interoperability, we will propose, within the Partnership framework, peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 1994. To coordinate joint military activities within the Partnership, we will invite states participating in the Partnership to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes.
16. Since its inception two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has greatly expanded the depth and scope of its activities. We will continue to work with all our NACC partners to build cooperative relationships across the entire spectrum of the Alliance's activities. With the expansion of NACC activities and the establishment of the Partnership for Peace, we have decided to offer permanent facilities at NATO Headquarters for personnel from NACC countries and other Partnership for Peace participants in order to improve our working relationships and facilitate closer cooperation.
17. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means constitutes a threat to international security and is a matter of concern to NATO. We have decided to intensify and expand NATO's political and defence efforts against proliferation, taking into account the work already underway in other international fora and institutions. In this regard, we direct that work begin immediately in appropriate fora of the Alliance to develop an overall policy framework to consider how to reinforce ongoing prevention efforts and how to reduce the proliferation threat and protect against it.
18. We attach crucial importance to the full and timely implementation of existing arms control and disarmament agreements as well as to achieving further progress on key issues of arms control and disarmament, such as:
    • the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and work towards an enhanced verification regime;
    • the early entry into force of the Convention on Chemical Weapons and new measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention;
    • the negotiation of a universal and verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
    • issues on the agenda of the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation;
    • ensuring the integrity of the CFE Treaty and full compliance with all its provisions.
19. We condemn all acts of international terrorism. They constitute flagrant violations of human dignity and rights and are a threat to the conduct of normal international relations. In accordance with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective cooperation possible to prevent and suppress this scourge.
20. We reaffirm our support for political and economic reform in Russia and welcome the adoption of a new constitution and the holding of democratic parliamentary elections by the people of the Russian Federation. This is a major step forward in the establishment of a framework for the development of durable democratic institutions. We further welcome the Russian government's firm commitment to democratic and market reform and to a reformist foreign policy. These are important for security and stability in Europe. We believe that an independent, democratic, stable and nuclear-weapons-free Ukraine would likewise contribute to security and stability. We will continue to encourage and support the reform processes in both countries and to develop cooperation with them, as with other countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
21. The situation in Southern Caucasus continues to be of special concern. We condemn the use of force for territorial gains. Respect for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia is essential to the establishment of peace, stability and cooperation in the region. We call upon all states to join international efforts under the aegis of the United Nations and the CSCE aimed at solving existing problems.
22. We reiterate our conviction that security in Europe is greatly affected by security in the Mediterranean. We strongly welcome the agreements recently concluded in the Middle East peace process which offer an historic opportunity for a peaceful and lasting settlement in the area. This much-awaited breakthrough has had a positive impact on the overall situation in the Mediterranean, thus opening the way to consider measures to promote dialogue, understanding and confidence-building between the countries in the region. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to continue to review the overall situation, and we encourage all efforts conducive to strengthening regional stability.
23. As members of the Alliance, we deplore the continuing conflict in the former Yugoslavia. We continue to believe that the conflict in Bosnia must be settled at the negotiating table and not on the battlefield. Only the parties can bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. Only they can agree to lay down their arms and end the violence which for these many months has only served to demonstrate that no side can prevail in its pursuit of military victory.
24. We are united in supporting the efforts of the United Nations and the European Union to secure a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Bosnia, agreeable to all parties, and we commend the European Union Action Plan of 22 November 1993 to secure such a negotiated settlement. We reaffirm our determination to contribute to the implementation of a viable settlement reached in good faith. We commend the front-line states for their key role in enforcing sanctions against those who continue to promote violence and aggression. We welcome the cooperation between NATO and the WEU in maintaining sanctions enforcement in the Adriatic.
25. We denounce the violations by the parties of the agreements they have already signed to implement a ceasefire and to permit the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to the victims of this terrible conflict. This situation cannot be tolerated. We urge all the parties to respect their agreements. We are determined to eliminate obstacles to the accomplishment of the UNPROFOR mandate. We will continue operations to enforce the No-Fly Zone over Bosnia. We call for the full implementation of the UNSC Resolutions regarding the reinforcement of UNPROFOR. We reaffirm our readiness, under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and in accordance with the Alliance decisions of 2 and 9 August 1993, to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this context, we urge the UNPROFOR authorities to draw up urgently plans to ensure that the blocked rotation of the UNPROFOR contingent in Srebrenica can take place and to examine how the airport at Tuzla can be opened for humanitarian relief purposes.
26. The past five years have brought historic opportunities as well as new uncertainties and instabilities to Europe. Our Alliance has moved to adapt itself to the new circumstances, and today we have taken decisions in key areas. We have given our full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity. We have endorsed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to adapt the Alliance to its future tasks. We have opened a new perspective of progressively closer relationships with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union. In doing all this, we have renewed our Alliance as a joint endeavour of a North America and Europe permanently committed to their common and indivisible security. The challenges we face are many and serious. The decisions we have taken today will better enable us to meet them.